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Abstract 
This paper reviews the empirical evidence on firm heterogeneity in international trade. A first 
wave of empirical findings from micro data on plants and firms proposed challenges for 
existing  models  of  inter-  national  trade  and  inspired  the  development  of  new  theories 
emphasizing  firm  heterogeneity.  Subsequent  empirical  research  has  examined  additional 
predictions  of  these  theories  and  explored  other  dimensions  of  the  data  not  originally 
captured by them. These other dimensions include multi-product firms, offshoring, intra-firm 
trade and firm export market dynamics. 
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Research in international trade has changed dramatically over the past ￿fteen years as its focus has shifted
from industries and countries to ￿rms and products. This transformation was instigated by the emergence
of a wide range of ￿micro￿-datasets exhibiting sharp variation in ￿rm outcomes and attributes, even within
narrow industries. Models developed in reaction to this challenge both rationalize this heterogeneity and o￿er
new insight into the ways in which economies respond to international trade. For example, the well-known
gravity equation relationship between aggregate trade and distance is largely accounted for by the extensive
margin of the number of heterogeneous ￿rms and products participating in trade rather than the intensive
margin of the amount traded per ￿rm and product.
One of the most striking features of the microdata is that ￿rm participation in international trade is
exceedingly rare. Researchers ￿nd that exporters and importers represent just a tiny fraction of producers
across many developed and developing economies. This participation is far from random. Indeed, the same
studies ￿nd that exporters and importers are larger, more productive, more skill- and capital-intensive, and
pay higher wages prior to their entry into international markets than non-trading ￿rms. These facts suggest
self-selection: exporters are more productive, not necessarily as a result of exporting, but because only the
most productive ￿rms are able to overcome the costs of entering export markets. The most successful model
of such selection is the seminal Melitz (2003) model, which has dominated recent research in the ￿eld. The key
insight of that model is that micro-heterogeneity in￿uences aggregate outcomes. When trade policy barriers
or transportation costs fall, high-productivity exporting ￿rms survive and expand while lower-productivity
non-exporting ￿rms shrink or exit. This reallocation of economic activity across ￿rms raises aggregate
productivity, an e￿ect of globalization that was largely neglected in previous theories of international trade
based on comparative advantage and consumer love of variety.
Much of recent theoretical research in international trade has focused on generalizing or elaborating on
this basic model of selection. Studies have explored the interaction between comparative advantage and
heterogeneous ￿rms (Bernard et al. 2007a), variable mark-ups and market size (Melitz & Ottaviano 2008),
country asymmetries (Arkolakis et al. 2008), multi-product ￿rms (Bernard et al. 2011, Eckel & Neary 2010,
Mayer et al. 2011), the decision whether to organize production activities within or beyond the boundaries of
the ￿rm (Antr￿s & Helpman 2004, 2008), managerial hierarchies within the ￿rm (Caliendo & Rossi-Hansberg
2011), labor market frictions (Amiti & Davis 2011, Egger & Kreickemeier 2009, Helpman and Itskhoki 2010,
and Helpman et al. 2011), and ￿nancial constraints (Chaney 2005, Manova 2011), among other issues. 1
We begin by reviewing the empirical challenges to traditional theories of international trade that emerged
from micro data on plants and ￿rms (Section 2). We next brie￿y discuss the development of theories of
heterogeneous ￿rms that have shaped much subsequent empirical research (Section 3). More recently, the
1For reviews of the theoretical literature on heterogeneous ￿rms and trade, see Helpman (2006) and Redding (2010).
2availability of microdata on individual trade transactions within the ￿rm has stimulated empirical research
on a whole host of new topics, including the extensive and intensive margins of trade (Section 4), multi-
product ￿rms (Section 5), ￿rm importing (Section 6), product quality (Section 7), intermediaries (Section
8), foreign direct investment (Section 9), intra-￿rm trade (Section 10), labor markets (Section 11), and ￿rm
export market dynamics (Section 12).
2 Empirical Challenges to Existing Trade Theories
Traditional (or ￿old￿) theories of international trade emphasize comparative advantage - that is variation
in opportunity costs of production across countries and industries - as the basis for international trade. In
these theories, international commerce takes the form of inter-industry trade, where countries export goods
in one set of industries and import goods in another set of industries. More recent (or ￿new￿) theories of
international trade instead focus on increasing returns to scale and consumer love of variety as the basis for
international trade, as in Krugman (1980), Helpman (1981) and Ethier (1982). These theories provide a
natural explanation for intra-industry trade, where countries both export and import goods within the same
industry. The two theories were combined within the integrated equilibrium approach of Helpman & Krugman
(1985). When suitably augmented to allow for technology di￿erences and cross-country variation in factor
prices, they provided a relatively successful explanation for patterns of trade across countries and industries,
as reviewed in Helpman (1999). A key simpli￿cation in this theoretical literature was the assumption of
a representative ￿rm within each industry. With the increased availability of micro datasets on ￿rms and
plants from the late 1980s and 1990s onwards, it became clear that there was in fact vast heterogeneity across
producers within industries, in terms of size, productivity, capital and skill-intensity, and wages. Furthermore
an emerging empirical literature began to explore the idea that this heterogeneity was systematically related
to trade participation in ways that could be in￿uential for aggregate outcomes.
2.1 Export Participation
Bernard & Jensen (1995) present evidence on U.S. manufacturing showing that typically a minority of plants
within an industry export. As illustrated in Table 1, which is taken from Bernard et al. (2007b) and uses
data from the 2002 U.S. Census of Manufactures, the overall share of U.S. manufacturing ￿rms that export is
relatively small at 18 percent (column 3). But there is considerable variation in export market participation
rates across industries within manufacturing: the share of exporters ranges substantially, from 38 percent in
Computer and Electronic Products to only 8 percent in Apparel. These exporting ￿rms also ship a relatively
small share of their total shipments abroad. As shown in column 4, the average share of shipments exported
is 14 percent for the manufacturing sector as a whole. But again there is substantial variation exists across
industries: from 21 percent in Computers to 7 percent in Beverages. While the results here use U.S. data,
3similar ￿ndings have emerged for a wide range of other countries, as summarized for example in Mayer &
Ottaviano (2007) and World Trade Organization (2008).
2.2 Exporter Characteristics
The ￿rst wave of microdata research demonstrated that not only is exporting rare but exporters are system-
atically di￿erent from non-exporters. Bernard & Jensen (1995) show that among U.S. manufacturing plants,
exporters are larger, more skill intensive, more capital intensive, and more productive. Table 2, also from
Bernard et al. (2007b), highlights these di￿erences for manufacturing ￿rms. Each row of the table summarizes
the average percent di￿erence between exporters and non-exporters for a particular characteristic.
As shown in the ￿rst column, there are substantial mean di￿erences between exporters and non-exporters.
On average, exporting ￿rms are larger in employment and sales, more productive, and use a di￿erent input
mix. Since export participation is correlated with industry characteristics, the inclusion of industry e￿ects
in the second column typically reduces the magnitude of these coe￿cients. But exporters remain di￿erent
from non-exporters even within the same disaggregated industry: they are 97 percent larger in employment
and 108 per cent larger in shipments; they are more productive by 11 per cent for value-added per worker
and 3 per cent for total factor productivity; they also pay higher wages by around 6 percent. Finally,
exporters are relatively more capital- and skill-intensive than non-exporters by approximately 12 and 11
percent, respectively.
While the correlation between ￿rm size and exporting accounts for some of the di￿erences between
exporters and non-exporters, they remain even after controlling for log employment, as shown in the third
column. Qualitatively similar results have been found for many other countries and time periods. 2
The ￿nding that U.S. exporters are more capital- and skill-intensive is consistent with ￿old￿ trade theory
forces of comparative advantage being at work within industries. If a ￿rm’s factor intensity re￿ects the nature
of the products it supplies, then ￿rms which are more capital- and skill-intensive are supplying products that
are more consistent with U.S. comparative advantage (Bernard et al. 2006b).
More di￿cult to square with old trade theory concepts of comparative advantage are empirical ￿ndings
that exporters are also more capital- and skill-intensive in developing countries, which are plausibly abundant
in unskilled labor (Alvarez & Lopez, 2005). If exporting ￿rms in these countries were supplying products
consistent with comparative advantage, they would be labor-intensive rather than capital- and skill-intensive.
Potential explanations for ￿ndings that exporters are more capital- and skill-intensive in both developed and
developing countries include technology-skill complementarity, as explored in Burstein & Vogel (2010) and
Harrigan & Reshe￿ (2011), and sorting by product quality within industries as in Verhoogen (2008).
2Similar di￿erences in performance are observed between ￿rms shipping to remote versus proximate locations within the
U.S., as shown in Holmes & Stevens (2010).
42.3 Sunk Costs and Selection into Exporting
The ￿nding that exporters are more productive than non-exporters raises the question of the direction of
causality: does high productivity induce ￿rms to self-select into export markets or does exporting cause
productivity growth through ￿learning by exporting.￿ An extensive body of research for many industries and
countries con￿rms that high productivity precedes entry into export markets. These ￿ndings are suggestive
of sunk costs of entry into export markets that only the most productive ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to incur,
as emphasized in Roberts & Tybout (1997). Whether there is also learning by exporting is less clear.
Early studies by Clerides et al. (1998) using data for Mexico, Colombia and Morocco and Bernard &
Jensen (1999) using U.S. data found no evidence of di￿erences in productivity growth between exporters
and non-exporters. Most research con￿rms these ￿ndings, however, some studies have found evidence of
productivity improvements following export market entry, such as Van Biesebroeck (2005) and de Loecker
(2007). Other recent research has provided evidence that export market entry may increase the return to
other complementary investments such as technology adoption, as examined theoretically in Constantini and
Melitz (2008) and shown empirically in Bustos (2011), Lileeva & Tre￿er (2010) and Aw et al. (2011).
2.4 Trade Liberalization, Reallocation, and Productivity Growth
Empirical analyses using microdata on plants and ￿rms reveal new channels through which trade liberaliza-
tion can a￿ect the aggregate economy. Beyond the e￿ects of the expansion in the range of product varieties
available to consumers, there exists the potential for within-industry productivity growth arising from de-
creasing trade costs. Trade liberalization reforms are typically accompanied by the contraction and exit of
low-productivity ￿rms and the expansion and entry into export markets of high-productivity ￿rms. This
reallocation of resources within industries raises average industry productivity.
Additionally, trade liberalization can have a ￿pro-competitive￿ e￿ect in reducing mark-ups of price over
marginal cost, so that trade liberalization reduces average prices through both lower average costs and lower
average mark-ups. These reductions in average prices in turn provide sources of welfare gain.
In the context of the Chilean trade liberalization, Pavcnik (2002) ￿nds that roughly two-thirds of the
19 percent increase in aggregate productivity is due to the relatively greater survival and growth of high-
productivity plants. A similar pattern of results is found in a large number of studies of trade liberalization
reforms in developing countries, as surveyed in Tybout (2003). Within-industry reallocations of resources in
these studies typically dominate cross-industry reallocations of resources.
One concern is that trade liberalization often occurs as part of a wider package of reforms. However, similar
patterns of productivity gains from the expansion of high-productivity exporting ￿rms have been found in
response to reductions in trade barriers in both Canada (Tre￿er, 2004) and the United States (Bernard et
al. 2006a). For example, Tre￿er (2004) ￿nds e￿ects of Canadian tari￿ reductions on industry productivity
5that are roughly twice as large as those on plant productivity, implying market share reallocations favoring
high-productivity plants.
Another source of aggregate productivity growth following trade liberalization is improvements in produc-
tivity within plants or ￿rms. In Pavcnik (2002), around one-third of the increase in aggregate productivity
following the Chilean liberalization was due to within-plant productivity gains. Similarly, in Tre￿er (2004),
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement is found to raise the labor productivity of Canadian manufacturing
plants by 7.4 percent or by an annual compound growth rate of 0.93 percent. These improvements in plant
or ￿rm productivity may be themselves the result of reallocations across disparate economic activities within
the plant or ￿rm, as discussed further below.
3 Heterogeneous Firm Theories
The empirical challenges to old and new trade theory from microdata have led to the development of new
theories of ￿rm heterogeneity and international trade. These theories not only account for the features of
disaggregated trade data noted above, but also yield additional predictions that have been the subject of
further empirical work. The seminal study of Melitz (2003) introduces ￿rm heterogeneity into Krugman’s
(1980) model of intra-industry trade to yield a tractable and ￿exible framework that has become a standard
platform for analyzing a host of issues in international trade. 3
In Melitz (2003), there is a competitive fringe of potential ￿rms who can enter an industry by paying
a ￿xed entry cost which is thereafter sunk. Potential entrants face ex ante uncertainty concerning their
productivity. Once the sunk entry cost is paid, a ￿rm draws its productivity from a ￿xed distribution and
productivity remains ￿xed thereafter. Firms produce horizontally di￿erentiated varieties within the industry
under conditions of monopolistic competition. The existence of ￿xed production costs implies that ￿rms
drawing a productivity level below the ￿zero-pro￿t productivity cuto￿￿ would make negative pro￿ts and
therefore exit the industry. Fixed and variable costs of exporting ensure that only those active ￿rms that
draw a productivity above a higher ￿export productivity cuto￿￿ ￿nd it pro￿table to export. 4
In this model, a symmetric reduction in trade barriers between all countries has a number of implications
for industry equilibrium. High-productivity exporting ￿rms experience increased revenue through greater
export market sales. The most productive non-exporters now ￿nd it pro￿table to enter export markets,
thereby increasing the fraction of exporting ￿rms. In contrast, low productivity ￿rms exit and there is a
contraction in the revenues of surviving ￿rms that only serve the domestic market. Each of these responses
3An alternative framework for modeling ￿rm heterogeneity is Bernard et al. (2003), which considers Bertrand competition in
the stochastic multi-country Ricardian model of trade of Eaton & Kortum (2002). Another approach is pursued in Yeaple (2005),
in which ￿rms are ex ante identical, but ￿rm heterogeneity emerges ex post through the endogenous allocation of heterogeneous
workers across ￿rms.
4For empirical evidence of sunk costs of exporting, see Roberts & Tybout (1997), Bernard & Jensen (2004), and Das et al.
(2007).
6reallocates resources towards high-productivity ￿rms and raises aggregate productivity through a change in
industry composition.
This theoretical framework addresses a number of the empirical challenges from microdata. Together
￿rm heterogeneity and ￿xed exporting costs imply that only some ￿rms export and these exporters are more
productive than non-exporters. The productivity advantage of exporting ￿rms re￿ects self-selection into
export markets rather than learning by exporting. Finally, the self-selection of ￿rms into export markets
ensures that trade liberalization has uneven e￿ects on low and high-productivity ￿rms and hence raises
aggregate productivity through a change in ￿rm composition.
While the assumption of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences in Melitz (2003) ensures
constant ￿rm mark-ups of price over marginal cost, Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz & Ottaviano (2008)
develop models of ￿rm heterogeneity in which mark-ups endogenous and trade liberalization can have a
pro-competitive e￿ect in reducing prices through lower mark-ups over marginal cost. In models with variable
elasticities of substitution, ￿rms with di￿erent productivities charge di￿erent mark-ups in a given market and
a ￿rm with a given productivity charges di￿erent mark-ups in the domestic and export markets. Using Slove-
nian data, De Loecker & Warzynski (2011) provide evidence of di￿erences in mark-ups between exporters and
non-exporters and discusses the implications of such variable mark-ups for estimated productivity di￿erences
between exporters and non-exporters.
In Bernard et al. (2007a), heterogeneous ￿rms are integrated into the standard trade paradigm of Helpman
& Krugman (1985). The resulting framework simultaneously explains why some countries export more in
certain industries than in others (endowment-driven comparative advantage), why two-way trade is observed
within industries (￿rm-level horizontal product di￿erentiation combined with increasing returns to scale), and
why, within industries, some ￿rms export and others do not (self-selection driven by trade costs). Consistent
with the empirical ￿ndings reported in Table 1, the fraction of exporting ￿rms and the share of exports in
￿rm shipments vary systematically with comparative advantage.
4 Gravity and the Extensive and Intensive Margins
One of the most successful empirical relationships in economics is the gravity equation, which relates the
value of total bilateral trade between countries to their economic mass and the variable trade costs between
them. Under the assumption that ￿rm productivity is Pareto distributed, the Melitz (2003) model yields a
gravity equation for total bilateral trade ￿ows, as shown in Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2008). 5 One
remarkable feature of this gravity equation is that the elasticity of trade ￿ows with respect to variable trade
costs depends not on the elasticity of substitution between ￿rm varieties but rather on the shape parameter
5For empirical evidence that the Pareto distribution provides a reasonable approximation to the observed distribution of ￿rm
sizes, see for example Axtell (2001).
7of the Pareto distribution for productivity.
The intuition for this result can be garnered by noting that aggregate bilateral trade between any two
countries (Xij) can be decomposed into the extensive margin of the number of exporting ￿rms (Mij) and







In the Melitz model, an increase in variable trade costs has two o￿setting e￿ects on the intensive margin. 6
On the one hand, higher variable trade costs reduce the value of exports of a given exporter, which reduces
average ￿rm exports. On the other hand, higher variable trade costs imply that some exporters who were
previously close to the productivity threshold for exporting can no longer generate su￿cient variable pro￿ts
to cover the ￿xed costs of exporting and exit the export market. Since these exiting exporters have smaller
export values than surviving exporters, this raises average ￿rm exports through a change in composition. In
the special case of a Pareto distribution, these two e￿ects exactly o￿set one another, leaving the intensive
margin independent of variable trade costs. As a result, variable trade costs only a￿ect bilateral trade
through the extensive margin, and the elasticity of this extensive margin with respect to variable trade costs
is determined by the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution for productivity.
The special case of the Melitz (2003) model with a Pareto distribution for productivity lies within the
class of theoretical models considered by Arkolakis et al. (2011a), in which a country’s share of trade with
itself is a su￿cient statistic for the welfare gains from opening the closed economy to trade. While empirical
studies have sought to quantify the contributions of particular sources of welfare gains, such as product
variety in Broda & Weinstein (2006), this theoretical analysis implies that the various sources of welfare
gains are related to one another in general equilibrium and that the overall e￿ect of trade on welfare can be
determined simply from a country’s share of trade with itself. 7
A key implication of the Melitz (2003) model is that the extensive margin of the number of exporting
￿rms should vary systematically with export market size, since in larger markets ￿rms of lower productivity
can generate su￿cient variable pro￿ts to cover the ￿xed costs of exporting. Using French export data by
￿rm and destination market, Eaton et al. (2004, 2011a) establish this and a number of other empirical
regularities. First, the number of French ￿rms selling to a market (relative to French market share) increases
with market size according to an approximately log linear relationship. Second, this pattern of ￿rm export
market participation exhibits an imperfect hierarchy, where ￿rms selling to less popular markets are more
likely to sell to more popular markets, but do not always do so. Third, export sales distributions are
6We de￿ne the intensive margin as average ￿rm exports conditional on exporting because it facilitates the decomposition of
average exports in (1) and has a straightforward empirical implementation. Chaney (2008) instead de￿nes the intensive margin
as exports of a given ￿rm to a given destination, in which case the intensive margin is una￿ected by composition.
7See also Atkeson and Burstein (2010) for an analysis of how the various sources of welfare gain are related to one another
in general equilibrium.
8remarkably similar across markets of very di￿erent size and extent of French participation. While the upper
tail of these distributions is approximately Pareto distributed, there are departures from a Pareto distribution
in the lower tail where small export shipments are observed. Fourth, average sales in France are higher for
￿rms selling to less popular foreign markets and to more foreign markets.
To explain these empirical regularities, Eaton et al. (2011a) consider an augmented version of the Melitz
model with a Pareto productivity distribution. To generate departures from a Pareto distribution of export
sales in the lower tail where small export shipments are observed, the ￿xed costs of entering each export
market are allowed to vary endogenously with a ￿rm’s choice of the fraction of consumers within that market
to serve, as in the marketing costs formulation of Arkolakis (2010). To incorporate imperfect hierarchies
of markets, the ￿xed costs of entering export markets are assumed to be subject to an idiosyncratic shock
for each ￿rm and destination market as well a common shock for each destination market. To allow for
idiosyncratic variation in export sales conditional on entering a given export market for ￿rms with a given
productivity, demand is also subject to an idiosyncratic shock for each ￿rm and destination market. While
a ￿rm’s decision to enter an export market depends on a composite of the market entry and demand shocks,
a ￿rm with a given productivity can enter a market because of a low entry shock and yet still have low sales
in that market because of a low demand shock.
The properties of the model depend on ￿ve key parameters: (i) a composite parameter that includes
both the elasticity of substitution and the Pareto shape parameter, (ii) the convexity of marketing costs, (iii)
the variance of demand shocks, (iv) the variance of entry shocks, and (v) the correlation between demand
and entry shocks. Eaton et al. (2011a) use simulated method of moments to estimate these parameters
using moments of the French export data by ￿rm and destination market. The ￿ve parameters are precisely
estimated and the parameterized model is shown to provide a good ￿t to the observed data. For the estimated
parameter values, ￿rm productivity accounts for around half of the observed variation across ￿rms in export
market participation, but explains substantially less of the variation in exports conditional on entering a
market.
Given the estimated parameter values, the model can be used to examine counterfactuals, such as a 10
percent reduction in bilateral trade barriers for all French ￿rms. In this counterfactual, total sales by French
￿rms rise by around $16 million, with most of this increase accounted for by a rise in sales of the top decile of
￿rms of around $23 million. In contrast, every other decile of ￿rms experiences a decline in sales, with around
half of the ￿rms in the bottom decile exiting. Taken together, these results suggest that the intra-industry
reallocations emphasized by theories of heterogeneous ￿rms and trade can be quantitatively large, even for
empirically reasonable changes in trade frictions. 8
8Other quantitative analyses of models of ￿rm heterogeneity and trade include the study of trade integration in Corcos et al.
(2010), the analysis of the impact of China’s productivity growth on world welfare in Hsieh & Ossa (2010), and the investigation
of patterns of trade in Bangladesh’s apparel sector in Cherkashin et al. (2010).
9Heterogeneous ￿rm theories also shed light on the prevalence of zeros in bilateral trade ￿ows. Using data
on trade between 158 countries from 1970-97, Helpman et al. (2008) ￿nd that around one half of the country
pairs do not trade with one another. Motivated by this feature of the data, they develop a multi-country
version of the Melitz (2003) model, in which ￿rm productivity is drawn from a truncated Pareto distribution.
In this framework, no ￿rm exports between a pair of countries if the productivity threshold for exporting
exceeds the upper limit of the productivity distribution in each country. Estimating a gravity equation
derived from the model, they show that controlling for both the non-random selection of positive trade ￿ows
and the extensive margin of exporting ￿rms has quantitatively important implications for estimates of the
e￿ects of standard trade frictions on trade ￿ows. Of these two corrections, controlling for the extensive
margin of the number of heterogeneous ￿rms that export is quantitatively more important than controlling
for the non-random selection of positive trade ￿ows. 9
Although most research on heterogeneous ￿rms and trade assumes a continuum of ￿rms, Eaton et al.
(2011b) argue that the existence of a ￿nite number of ￿rms provides an alternative potential explanation
for zero bilateral trade ￿ows. Even if the productivity distribution is unbounded from above, with a ￿nite
number of ￿rms there is a positive probability that no ￿rm draws a productivity above the threshold for
exporting between a pair of countries.
5 Multi-product Firms
One of the striking feature of international trade data is the extent to which international trade is concentrated
in the hands of a few ￿rms. As reported in Bernard et al. (2009a), the top 1 percent of ￿rms account for
around 90 percent of the value of U.S. trade, even though they account for only around 15 percent of
employment. Similar levels of concentration are observed in other countries, as summarized in World Trade
Organization (2008).
One reason why international trade is so concentrated is that larger exporters not only export more
of a given product to a given destination than smaller exporters, but also export more products to more
destinations. Table 3, from Bernard et al. (2007b), reports the distribution of exporters, export value and
employment by the number of products and export destinations. Around 40 percent of exporting ￿rms export
a single product to a single destinations (panel A), but these ￿rms account for less than 1 percent of export
value (panel B). In contrast, the 12 percent of ￿rms that export more than ￿ve products to more than ￿ve
destinations account for more than 90 percent of export value.
To make sense of ￿rms’ decisions over the extensive margins of products and destinations, Bernard et al.
(2011) develop a model of multi-product, multi-destination ￿rms that is a generalization of Melitz’s (2003)
9Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) consider an alternative approach to zero trade ￿ows using the Poisson ￿xed e￿ects
estimator.
10framework. In order to enter, ￿rms incur a sunk entry cost, which reveals their ability. Firms then choose
among a continuum of products and many export markets. Firm pro￿tability depends upon the interaction
of ￿rm ability, which is common across products, and ￿rm-product attributes, which are idiosyncratic across
products and possibly also across export destinations. Firms face ￿xed costs in serving each market and
in supplying each product to each market. Higher ability ￿rms can generate su￿cient variable pro￿ts to
cover the product ￿xed cost at a lower value of product attributes and supply a wider range of products to
each market. For su￿ciently low values of ￿rm ability, the excess of variable pro￿ts over product ￿xed costs
in the small range of pro￿table products does not cover the ￿xed cost of serving the market and therefore
the ￿rm does not supply the market. The lowest-ability ￿rms exit, intermediate-ability ￿rms serve only the
domestic market and the highest ability ￿rms export. Within exporters, products with the worst attributes
are supplied only to the domestic market, while products with the best attributes are exported to the largest
number of markets.
While the standard heterogeneous-￿rm model emphasizes selection across ￿rms, this model also empha-
sizes selection within ￿rms. Selection within ￿rms provides a potential rationale for the e￿ects of trade
liberalization on within-￿rm productivity found in the empirical studies discussed above, since trade liberal-
ization induces ￿rms to drop their least successful products with low revenue productivity. Using data from
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), Bernard et al. (2011) and Baldwin & Gu (2009) provide
empirical evidence of product rationalization following trade liberalization.
The extensive margins highlighted by models of multi-product ￿rms have important implications for
the mechanisms underlying aggregate economic relationships. Aggregate bilateral trade between any two
countries (Xij) can be decomposed into the extensive margin of the number of ￿rm-product observations
with positive exports (Oij) and the intensive margin of average ￿rm-product exports conditional on positive
trade ( xij = Xij=Oij):






where the number of ￿rm-product observations with positive trade can be decomposed in turn into the
extensive margins of the number of exporting ￿rms ( Mij), the number of exported products (Nij) and a
density term (Dij = Oij=(MijNij)) that captures the extent to which each ￿rm exports each product:






Table 4 reports the results of estimating gravity equations for aggregate U.S. exports and each of the
extensive and intensive margins in (2) and (3). The table is taken from Bernard et al. (2011) and destination
market size and variable trade costs are proxied using destination market GDP and geographical distance
respectively. The well-known negative e￿ect of distance on aggregate bilateral trade (column 1) is entirely
accounted for by the extensive margin of the number of ￿rm-product observations with positive trade (column
113). In contrast, distance has a positive but statistically insigni￿cant e￿ect on the intensive margin of average
exports per ￿rm-product conditional on positive trade (column 2). The extensive margins of the number of
exporting ￿rms and the number of exported products both decline with distance (columns 4 and 5). The
opposite is true of density, because each ￿rm is active in a limited subset of products, which implies that the
number of ￿rm-product observations with positive trade ( Oij) increases less than proportionately than the
number of ￿rms times the number of products (MijNij).
The theoretical model discussed above provides a natural explanation for these empirical ￿ndings. A
reduction in variable trade costs lowers product prices in each export market which increases revenue and
variable pro￿ts. Reductions in variable trade costs raise aggregate exports through the share of products
exported to a given country by incumbent exporters (within-￿rm product extensive margin), an increase
in the average number of countries to which a given product is supplied by incumbent ￿rms (within-￿rm
country extensive margin) and lower-ability ￿rms that previously only served the domestic market enter
export markets (the across-￿rm extensive margin). In contrast, selection within ￿rms implies that reductions
in variable trade costs have ambiguous e￿ects on the intensive margin of average exports per ￿rm-product,
because they increase exports of a given ￿rm and product, but induce entry into export markets of ￿rms and
products with smaller export values.
A growing theoretical and empirical literature in international trade has investigated a variety of im-
plications of multi-product, multi-destination ￿rms. While early contributions such as Ottaviano & Thisse
(1999) and Allanson & Montagna (2005) modeled ￿rms and products symmetrically, more recent research
has explored the idea that ￿rms have core competences. Eckel & Neary (2010) consider a model of ￿exible
manufacturing where each ￿rm faces rising marginal costs in producing products further from its core com-
petence. Firms are large relative to the market and hence face a cannibalization e￿ect, where introducing
additional products diminishes the demand for the ￿rm’s existing products. 10 Javorcik et al. (2010) consider
an augmented version of this model, in which ￿rms can make endogenous investments in the quality of each
product and in their overall brand. Using Mexican trade transactions data, they provide empirical evidence
in support of the model’s key predictions for the relationship between product prices and sales rank within
the ￿rm.
Other recent research has concentrated on monopolistically-competitive models of multiple-product ￿rms
without cannibalization e￿ects. In Mayer et al. (2011), ￿rms face a product ladder, where productiv-
ity/quality declines discretely for each additional variety produced. Together with variable mark-ups, this
generates the prediction that ￿rm sales are more skewed towards core competences in more competitive
markets. French export data provide strong empirical support for this prediction of the model. In Arkolakis
& Muendler (2010), ￿rms face declining productivity for each additional variety supplied to a market and
10See also Feenstra & Ma (2008) and Dhingra (2010).
12market entry costs that are increasing in the number of varieties supplied to a market. Using Brazilian trade
transactions data, they present evidence in support of the model’s prediction of a positive relationship be-
tween the number of products that a ￿rm exports to a market and average exports per product. In contrast,
in Nocke and Yeaple (2006), ￿rms with higher organizational capability produce more products and have
higher marginal costs for all products, which generates a negative relationship between ￿rms’ extensive and
intensive margins.
While most of the above research concentrates on the determinants of the products and destinations
supplied by multi-product ￿rms at a given point time, there is evidence that product market entry and exit
within surviving ￿rms is in￿uential for ￿rm, industry and aggregate dynamics over time. Using U.S. Census
of Manufactures data, Bernard et al. (2010a) ￿nd that around one half of surviving U.S. ￿rms add and/or
drop products from their existing range every ￿ve years, and the contribution of these added and dropped
products to aggregate output is of around the same magnitude as the contribution of ￿rm entry and exit. 11
Consistent with a natural generalization of models of industry dynamics to incorporate selection with ￿rms,
the probability that a product is dropped within a surviving ￿rm exhibits the same pattern of age and scale
dependence as the probability that a ￿rm exits. Taken together, these ￿ndings suggest that reallocation may
be even more important than hitherto thought, in so far as it occurs across products within ￿rms as well as
across ￿rms.
6 Firm Importing
The early empirical literature on ￿rm heterogeneity in international trade concentrated almost exclusively on
￿rm export behavior, since only exporting information was recorded in censuses of domestic production or
manufacturing. More recent work using ￿rm-level trade transaction data has begun to examine heterogeneity
in ￿rm import behavior.
Firm importing displays many of the same features as ￿rm exporting. Bernard et al. (2007b) ￿nd that,
for U.S. manufacturing ￿rms, importing is somewhat rarer than exporting and there is substantial variation
across industries. The shares of exporting and importing ￿rms are signi￿cantly positively correlated (0.87)
across industries. Around 41 percent of exporters also import while 79 percent of importers also export. The
share of export-only ￿rms is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with industry skill intensity, while the
share of import-only ￿rms is negatively but not signi￿cantly correlated with industry skill intensity.
Importers exhibit a number of the same performance di￿erences as exporters. As reported in Table 5
from Bernard et al. (2007b), importers are bigger, more productive, pay higher wages and are more skill-
and capital-intensive than non-importers. From a comparison of the ￿rst and second columns with the third
11The production of multiple products complicates the measurement of ￿rm productivity when separate data on outputs,
inputs and prices are not available at the ￿rm-product level, as considered in Bernard et al. (2009c) and De Loecker (2011).
13column, the performance di￿erences between ￿rms that participate in international trade and those that do
not are partly driven by ￿rms that both import and export, which exhibit the largest performance di￿erences
from domestic ￿rms. These ￿ndings suggest that trade liberalization is likely to bene￿t the largest, most
productive, most skill- and capital-intensive ￿rms within industries, not only through enhanced access to
export markets, but also through improved availability of imported intermediate inputs.
While empirical studies of the impact of trade liberalization on productivity have typically focused on
reductions in tari￿s in output markets, more recent evidence suggests that reductions in tari￿s on imported
intermediate inputs may be a prominent source of productivity gains. Amiti & Konings (2007) use manufac-
turing census data from Indonesia, which contains plant-level information on imported intermediate inputs,
to construct separate measures of input and output tari￿s. Following the trade liberalization that occurred in
the 1990s, they ￿nd that reductions in input tari￿s are associated with an increase in productivity of around
12 percent for ￿rms that import their inputs, which is around twice as large as the e￿ect for reductions in
output tari￿s.
Input tari￿s may a￿ect productivity through a number of potential channels, including learning about
foreign technologies, expansion in the variety of intermediate inputs available for production, and access to
higher-quality intermediate inputs. Following India’s trade liberalization in the early 1990s, Goldberg et al.
(2010) ￿nd that around two thirds of the growth in imports of intermediate inputs is accounted for by the
extensive margin of newly imported products. In industries that experienced greater tari￿ reductions, there
is a larger increase in total value, a greater reduction in prices and a larger expansion in variety of imported
intermediate inputs. Consistent with the idea that the availability of new intermediate inputs expanded the
technological possibilities of ￿rms, industries that saw greater increases in the variety of imported intermediate
inputs also experienced greater increases the range of products produced by Indian ￿rms.
More generally, the presence of both importing and exporting within ￿rms suggests the relevance of
theories of the ￿fragmentation of production,￿ such as Dixit & Grossman (1982) and Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). In these models, ￿rms can organize stages of production across national borders. Using
input-output tables for 10 OECD and four emerging-market countries, Hummels et al. (2001) estimate
that such vertical specialization accounts for around 20 percent of countries exports and grew by around 30
percent between 1970 and 1990. As shown in Yi (2003), when stages of production are spread across national
boundaries in this way, changes in trade costs can have a magni￿ed impact on trade ￿ows, because they are
incurred each time the good is traded back and forth between countries. 12
12For a discussion of how global supply chains in￿uenced the impact of the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan, see
Economist (2011).
147 Product Quality
Even within narrowly-de￿ned product categories, such as the 8,000+ products of the ten-digit Harmonized
System (HS) classi￿cation, there is tremendous variation in unit values across trade partners. A growing
literature in international trade argues that this variation in prices re￿ects di￿erences in product quality
across trade partners, as in Schott (2004) and Hummels & Klenow (2005). 13 Furthermore, this variation in
prices is strongly related to country endowments, with more capital and skill-abundant countries supplying
varieties with higher prices within narrow product categories. According to this view, capital and skill-
abundant countries use their endowments to supply products of higher quality, and this higher product
quality is re￿ected in a higher price.
Many papers use microdata to study the relationship between price variation and trade patterns at
the ￿rm level. For instance, Manova and Zhang (2011) use Chinese trade transactions data to highlight a
number of systematic features of exports and imports by ￿rm, product and destination that are consistent
with heterogeneity in product quality. 14 For example, across ￿rms selling a given product, ￿rms that charge
higher export prices earn greater revenues in each destination, have bigger worldwide sales, and export to
more markets. Across destinations within a ￿rm-product, ￿rms set higher prices in richer, larger, bilaterally
more distant and overall less remote countries. Finally, ￿rms that export pay a wider range of input prices
and source inputs from more countries. Taken together these features of the data are consistent with a
heterogeneous ￿rm model where more successful exporters use higher-quality inputs to produce higher-quality
goods and ￿rms vary the quality of their products across destinations.
Using Colombian census of manufactures data, Kugler & Verhoogen (2011) provide evidence of di￿erences
in product quality and highlight the relationship between ￿rm export and import decisions. Within narrowly
de￿ned industries, larger ￿rms charge more for their outputs and pay more for their inputs than smaller
￿rms, and similar di￿erences exist between exporters and non-exporters. This pattern of results is consistent
with an extension of Melitz (2003), in which ￿rms endogenously choose both input and output quality and
there is a complementarity between the quality of inputs and outputs.
In Melitz (2003), the assumptions of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences and monopo-
listic competition imply that ￿rm productivity and product quality are isomorphic in the sense that they
enter equilibrium ￿rm revenue in exactly the same way. An empirical literature has sought to distinguish
productivity and product quality by exploiting variation in prices across ￿rms on the grounds that higher
productivity implies lower prices whereas higher product quality can lead to higher prices, as explored in
Baldwin & Harrigan (2011) and Johnson (2010). One empirical challenge facing this literature is that ￿rms
supply horizontally di￿erentiated varieties in Melitz (2003) and the speci￿cation of consumer preferences in
13For evidence on the role of product quality in explaining patterns of bilateral trade, see Hallak (2006).
14See also Bastos and Silva (2008) for evidence using Portuguese trade transactions data.
15which all varieties enter utility symmetrically implicitly imposes a choice of units in which to measure the
quantity of each variety. There is no necessary relationship between this normalization and the units in which
physical quantities of output are measured for each ￿rm in the data. As a result, data on physical quantities
of output cannot be directly compared across ￿rms in the presence of horizontal product di￿erentiation,
which complicates the interpretation of variation in unit values across ￿rms.
Using unit values to make inferences about the role of product quality in determining export patterns
can be misleading because many factors other than quality a￿ect prices. For instance, holding quality ￿xed,
more e￿cient ￿rms may ￿nd it optimal to charge lower prices for their products. Instead, recent papers
obtain a proxy for product quality from demand residuals. Because consumers decide how much to purchase
of each good by comparing quality-adjusted prices, two ￿rms that charge the same price but have di￿erent
market shares must sell varieties of di￿erent quality. In particular, ￿rms that sell large quantities of physical
output conditional on price are classi￿ed as high quality producers. Khandelwal (2011) applies this method
to estimate quality for a broad sample of countries using aggregate trade data. He ￿nds that markets
characterized by relatively small scope for quality di￿erentiation are associated with larger employment and
output declines resulting from low-wage competition. Similarly, Hallak & Schott (2011) estimate quality for a
panel of 43 countries between 1989 and 2003. They ￿nd that export quality is correlated with the exporter’s
income per capita, but they also ￿nd that during this period quality levels are converging whereas income
per capita is not. Finally, Gervais (2011) uses US Census data to estimate quality at the plant-level and
decomposes cross-plant variation in price and export status into quality and e￿ciency margins. Prices are
found to be increasing in quality and decreasing in e￿ciency, but, selection into exporting is driven mainly
by quality.
8 Intermediaries
While in many models of international trade consumers purchase imports directly from foreign producers, the
prevalence of ￿rm importing has stimulated recent research on the role of intermediaries, such as wholesalers
and retailers, in the process of international trade. Bernard et al. (2010c) examine the di￿erences between
wholesalers, retailers and other categories of U.S. trading ￿rms. 15 While wholesale ￿rms comprise 35 percent
of exporters and 42 percent of importers, they account for only 8 percent of export value and 15 percent of
import value. Retailers are less prevalent and smaller than wholesalers, accounting for 9 percent of exporters
and 13 percent of importers but only 1 percent of export and import value. In contrast, ￿rms with operations
in wholesale or retail and other sectors (typically large ￿rms) comprise around only 5 percent of exporters
and importers, but account for more than 60 percent of export value and more than 50 percent of import
15As in most international trade datasets, ￿rms that trade directly in LFTTD cannot be compared to those that trade
indirectly via wholesalers or retailers, since the latter’s sales or purchases within the U.S. are not observed.
16value. Therefore the vast majority of trade is undertaken by a relatively small number of large traders that
vertically integrate Wholesaling/Retailing functions within ￿rm boundaries. Using Italian trade transactions
data, Bernard et al. (2010d) ￿nd that the share of exports mediated by wholesalers is positively correlated
with proxies for country-speci￿c ￿xed costs, including the World Bank’s Doing Business measures of the
number of documents for importing, cost of importing and time to import.
Using Chinese trade transactions data, Ahn et al. (2011) consider a di￿erent de￿nition of intermediaries
based on ￿rms having the English-equivalent meaning of ￿importer,￿ ￿exporter,￿ and/or ￿trading￿ in their
name. Such intermediary ￿rms account for around $168 billion of China’s exports or around 22 percent of the
total. The paper develops a model in which intermediaries are used by relatively small ￿rms that do not ￿nd
it pro￿table to incur the ￿xed costs of directly exporting to foreign markets by themselves. 16 Consistent with
intermediaries handling the products of other ￿rms, they export relatively more products per destination
market than other trading ￿rms. In line with the idea that the ￿xed costs of direct exporting are more likely
to be prohibitive in a small and remote foreign market, intermediaries account for larger export shares in
smaller markets and markets with higher trade costs.
Blum et al. (2011) provide further indirect evidence on intermediation using matched importer-exporter
transactions data for Chile and Colombia. Consistent with the concentration of U.S. trade discussed above,
the distributions of bilateral exports and imports between Chile and Columbia are highly skewed across
￿rms. More than half of exporters sell to only one importer, whereas the 99th percentile exporter sells to 19
importers. Similarly, more than half of importers deal with only one exporter, whereas the 99th percentile
importers deals with 9 exporters. But, while one party to a transaction can be small and engage with few other
traders, the other party to the transaction is typically large and deals with many other traders. This pattern
of results is consistent with the idea that e￿cient trades involve large trade volumes, which can be achieved
either by small importers matching with large exporters or small exporters matching with large importers.
Motivated by these ￿ndings, the paper develops a theoretical model in which ￿rms choose whether to access
markets directly or indirectly via intermediaries. Since the direct exporting technology is characterized by
increasing returns to scale, it is used by large exporters selling directly to many importers. In contrast, the
intermediation technology is employed by large importers that spread the costs of intermediation over many
small exporters.
More broadly, a key challenge in international trade is opening the black box of trade costs. Theories of
heterogeneous ￿rms and international trade posit the existence of ￿xed and variable trade cost parameters,
but there is still little understanding of what these parameters capture. The literature on intermediaries in
international trade takes some ￿rst steps towards understanding the chains of decisions involved in conduct-
ing goods from production to ￿nal consumption. Recent empirical research suggests that these trade and
16Other models of intermediation with similar patterns of selection of ￿rms into intermediation and direct exporting include
Akerman (2010) and Felbermayr & Jung (2008).
17distribution networks may be important for a variety of issues in international trade, such as the border e￿ect,
exchange rate pass-through and the relationship between nominal and real exchange rates, as in Burstein
et al. (2005) and Li et al. (2011). Other micro evidence on the potential importance of ￿rm distribution
networks comes from empirical ￿ndings of ￿Carry-Along Trade (CAT)￿ in Bernard et al. (2010e), where more
than three quarters of the exported products and more than one quarter of export value from Belgian man-
ufacturers are in goods that are not produced by ￿rms. Recent theoretical research on search, networks and
intermediation in international trade (e.g. Rauch & Trinidade 2003, Petropoulou 2007, Antr￿s & Costinot
2011) provides further guidance for future empirical work.
9 Foreign Direct Investment
While Melitz (2003) focuses on exports, Helpman et al. (2004) generalize the analysis to incorporate hori-
zontal FDI, allowing ￿rms to choose between incurring a ￿xed cost of exporting or a ￿xed cost of establishing
an overseas a￿liate. If the ￿xed costs of FDI are su￿ciently high relative to the ￿xed costs of exporting, the
most productive ￿rms serve the foreign market through FDI; ￿rms with a intermediate range of productivities
export; ￿rms with a lower range of productivities only serve the domestic market. With a Pareto produc-
tivity distribution, the importance of FDI relative to exporting as a mode for serving the foreign market
is increasing in the dispersion of ￿rm productivity. Consistent with this prediction, Helpman et al. (2004)
show that the share of total foreign market sales accounted for by the sales of foreign a￿liates is larger in
industries with greater sales dispersion (as an empirical proxy for productivity dispersion).
Using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) microdata on U.S. ￿rms and their overseas a￿liates, Yeaple
(2009) provides further evidence in support of theories of heterogeneous ￿rms and FDI. Consistent with ￿rm
selection, more productive U.S. ￿rms own a￿liates in a larger number of countries and these a￿liates generate
greater revenue on sales in their host countries. Consistent with country selection, as a country becomes
more attractive to U.S. multinationals, it attracts progressively smaller and less productive ￿rms. While the
model accounts for many features of the data, there are others that are less well explained. The dispersion in
the number of foreign countries entered is smaller than predicted by the model given the observed dispersion
in U.S. market shares: large ￿rms invest in too few foreign locations and small ￿rms invest in too many, with
the largest ￿rms underrepresented among the least attractive locations.
Using Norwegian data, Irarrazabal et al. (2010) show that patterns of multinational activity by ￿rm and
destination market exhibit a number of similarities with the patterns of trade by ￿rm and destination market
in Eaton et al. (2011a). In particular, while total a￿liate sales and the number of foreign a￿liates are less
sensitive to distance than exports, they both decline with distance. This gravity-equation relationship is
inconsistent with a simple model of horizontal FDI, in which FDI should become more attractive as a mode
18for serving the foreign market as trade costs increase. 17 To explain these ￿ndings, Irarrazabal et al. (2010)
extend the model of ￿rm heterogeneity and FDI of Helpman et al. (2004) to incorporate traded intermediate
inputs and ￿nd empirical support for the extended model.
10 Intra-Firm Trade
While many models of FDI assume that overseas production is organized within the boundaries of the ￿rm,
this decision is itself endogenous. Furthermore, when FDI takes place, foreign a￿liates may produce di￿erent
stages of production (vertical FDI) instead of the same stage of production (horizontal FDI) as the parent
￿rm. To the extent that stages of production are traded across national borders, whether overseas production
is organized within the boundaries of the ￿rm determines whether ￿rm importing takes place between related
parties or at arms length.
Related-party trade accounts for around one half of U.S. imports and exhibits a number of systematic
patterns.18 In particular, intra-￿rm trade is concentrated in capital-intensive industries and between capital-
abundant countries. To explain these features of the data, Antr￿s (2003) models a ￿nal goods producer
who decides whether to outsource foreign production of an intermediate input to a standalone supplier or
to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) in which case the overseas production of the intermediate
input is vertically integrated within the ￿rm. The ￿nal goods producer and the intermediate input supplier
make relationship-speci￿c investments in capital and labor respectively. Contracts are incomplete because
neither the quality of the intermediate input nor the amount of investments in capital and labor can be
veri￿ed by a third party and contracts cannot be written on sales revenues. The only contractibles are
therefore the allocation of residual rights on control and an ex ante transfer between the ￿nal goods supplier
and intermediate input producer. Since the ￿nal goods producer’s investment in capital is relatively more
important in a capital-intensive industry, vertical integration is more likely in the capital-intensive industry,
matching the empirical ￿ndings on U.S. imports. Furthermore, the model is also consistent with the empirical
￿nding of a higher share of intra-￿rm trade in U.S. imports from capital-abundant countries, because there
is greater intra-industry trade in the capital-intensive industry with these countries.
Antr￿s & Helpman (2004) augment the analysis to incorporate ￿rm heterogeneity. Since the ￿xed costs of
producing abroad are lower when outsourcing to a foreign supplier than when using foreign direct investment,
only the most productive ￿rms can generate su￿cient variable pro￿ts to o￿set the large ￿xed costs of vertical
integration. As a result, the share of U.S. imports that are intra-￿rm is predicted to increase not only in the
share of relationship-speci￿c investments undertaken by the headquarters ￿rm but also in the dispersion of
17In principle, the gravity equation relationship for a￿liate sales and the number of a￿liates can be reconciled with a model
of horizontal FDI if there there are costs of operating foreign a￿liates that increase with distance. See, for example, Keller &
Yeaple (2011) and Arkolakis et al. (2011b).
18U.S. import partners are de￿ned as being ￿related￿ if either party owns, directly or indirectly, 6 percent or more of the other
party.
19￿rm productivity. To examine these predictions, Nunn & Tre￿er (2008) use U.S. data on related-party and
arms-length trade by disaggregated HS 6-digit product and on capital and skill-intensity for more aggregated
industries. Consistent with the predictions of the model, the share of intra-￿rm trade in U.S. imports is
increasing in industry capital and skill-intensity (as proxies for the importance of headquarters investments),
in the dispersion of U.S. exports within each 6-digit product (as a proxy for the dispersion of productivity),
and in interactions between these two variables.
Antr￿s & Helpman (2008) generalize the analysis to allow inputs to be partially contractible. In this
framework, an improvement in foreign property rights has two o￿setting e￿ects on the share of intra-￿rm
trade through the two productivity cuto￿s which separate domestic production (low productivity), foreign
outsourcing (intermediate productivity) and foreign vertical integration (high productivity). On the one
hand, an improvement in foreign property rights reduces the productivity cuto￿ for outsourcing, as some
inputs that were previously produced domestically are now outsourced abroad, which reduces the share of
intra-￿rm trade. On the other hand, as foreign property rights improve, the intermediate input supplier’s
share of non-contractible inputs falls, which implies that the party whose investments require relatively more
incentives is the headquarters ￿rm. As a result, the productivity cuto￿ for vertical integration falls, as some
inputs that were previously outsourced abroad are now vertically integrated abroad, which increases the
share of intra-￿rm trade. For a range of parameter values, the second e￿ect can dominate, which yields
the surprising prediction that an improvement in foreign property rights can increase the extent of vertical
integration. Consistent with this prediction, Nunn & Tre￿er (2008) ￿nd that the share of intra-￿rm trade
is positively related to interactions between capital and skill-intensity (as proxies for the importance of
headquarters investments) and an empirical measure of the ￿rule of law￿ (as a proxy for the quality of foreign
property rights).19
Additional empirical support for the above theoretical predictions is provided by Yeaple (2006), which
uses Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on the value of imports by U.S. parent ￿rms from their foreign
a￿liates as a measure of intra-￿rm trade. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Antr￿s & Helpman
(2004), the share of intra-￿rm trade in U.S. imports is increasing in both industry capital-intensity and
research and development (R&D) intensity (as proxies for the importance of headquarters investments) and
the dispersion of sales across establishments within industries (as a proxy for the dispersion of productivity).
These estimated e￿ects vary with U.S. trade partners’ levels of development, with the largest and most
precisely estimated coe￿cients found for the least-developed and newly-developing countries. 20
19For more general evidence on the role of property rights in determining the pattern of trade, see Nunn (2007). Another
dimension of institutions emphasized in the literature of heterogeneous ￿rms and trade is credit constraints, as examined in
Manova (2011).
20Corcos et al. (2010) and Defever & Toubal (2010) examine the determinants of intra-￿rm trade using French trade trans-
actions data. While Defever & Toubal (2010) explore the implications of di￿erent assumptions about the relative magnitude of
the ￿xed costs of outsourcing and vertical integration, Corcos et al. (2010) emphasize the distinction between the extensive and
intensive margins.
20To further examine the determinants of intra-￿rm trade, Bernard et al. (2010b) use the trade-transactions
and establishment-employment data in LFTTD to construct a new measure of products’ ￿revealed con-
tractibility,￿ which is based on the idea that contracting is likely to be easier for products passing through
intermediaries such as wholesalers. Intra-￿rm trade exhibits a non-linear relationship with these country
and industry characteristics. On the one hand, higher quality property rights are associated with a higher
probability of related-party trade taking place. On the other hand, conditional on positive related-party
trade occurring, higher quality property rights are correlated with a lower share of related-party trade, which
is consistent with the idea that higher quality property rights facilitate arms-length transactions.
11 Labor Markets
A key implication of the Melitz (2003) model is that ￿rms are unevenly a￿ected by trade liberalization: low-
productivity ￿rms exit, intermediate-productivity domestic ￿rms contract, and high-productivity exporting
￿rms expand. In contrast, workers are symmetrically a￿ected by trade liberalization, since workers are
identical and labor markets are frictionless, so that all workers are employed for a common wage. These labor
market implications sit awkwardly with the large empirical literature on the employer-size wage premium
(see, for example, the survey by Oi & Idson 1999) and empirical ￿ndings of wage di￿erences between exporters
and non-exporters even after controlling for ￿rm size (see, in particular, Bernard & Jensen 1995, 1997).
More recently, the theoretical literature on heterogeneous ￿rms and trade has highlighted two sets of
reasons why wages can vary with revenue across ￿rms. One line of research assumes competitive labor
markets, so that all workers with the same characteristics are paid the same wage, but wages vary across
￿rms as a result of di￿erences in workforce composition (see for example Bustos 2007, Verhoogen 2008 and
Yeaple 2005). Another line of research introduces labor market frictions, so that workers with the same
characteristics can be paid di￿erent wages by di￿erent ￿rms. One source of labor market imperfections is
search and matching frictions, where bargaining over the surplus from production can potentially induce
wages to vary with revenue across ￿rms (see for example Davidson et al. 2008, Cosar et al. 2011, and
Helpman et al. 2010). Another source of labor market imperfections is e￿ciency or fair wages, where the
wage that induces e￿ort or is perceived to be fair varies with revenue across ￿rms (see for example Amiti &
Davis 2011, Davis & Harrigan 2011, and Egger & Kreickemeier 2009). 21
This class of theoretical models highlights a new mechanism for trade to a￿ect wage inequality based
on wage variation across ￿rms and the selection of ￿rms into international markets. Helpman et al. (2011)
provide evidence on the quantitative importance of this new mechanism for understanding the relationship
between wage inequality and trade using Brazilian employer-employee data. Consistent with the class of
21In the presence of labor market frictions, trade may also a￿ect income inequality through changes in unemployment, as in
Felbermayr et al. 2011 and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010).
21theoretical models discussed above, the rise in overall wage inequality is driven by a rise in wage inequality
within sector-occupations for workers with similar observed occupations; this rise in wage inequality within
sector-occupations occurs between rather than within-￿rms; and the change in between-￿rm wage dispersion
is systematically related to ￿rm trade participation. To the extent that existing empirical studies inspired by
neoclassical trade theory focus on changes in relative wages between di￿erent sectors and types of workers,
they abstract from an important channel through which trade liberalization can a￿ect wage inequality.
A number of recent empirical studies have used matched employer-employee data to try to determine
whether wage di￿erences between exporters and non-exporters (as found by Bernard & Jensen 1995, 1997)
are the result of di￿erences in the composition of workers across ￿rms or wage premia for workers with the
same characteristics. Following Abowd et al. (1999, 2001), this literature typically estimates worker and ￿rm
￿xed e￿ects under the strong identifying assumptions that switches of workers between ￿rms are random
conditional on the covariates and that each worker’s wage is a log linear function of their ability and does
not depend directly on the ability of their co-workers. Empirical studies within this literature generally ￿nd
contributions from both di￿erences in workforce composition and wage premia, with the relative magnitude
of these contributions varying across studies. Using Mexican data, Fr￿as et al. (2009) ￿nd that approximately
two-thirds of the higher level of wages in larger, more productive plants is explained by higher levels of wage
premia and that nearly all of the di￿erential changes in wages within industries as a result of the shock of
the peso devaluation are explained by changes in wage premia. Using German data, Schank et al. (2007)
￿nd that wage di￿erences between exporters and non-exporters become smaller but do not completely vanish
once observable and unobservable characteristics of the employees and of the workplace are controlled for. 22
Amiti & Davis (2011) provide theory and evidence on the separate impacts of input and output tari￿s
on ￿rm wages. An augmented version of the Melitz (2003) model to incorporate ￿rm importing predicts
that a fall in output tari￿s lowers wages at import-competing ￿rms, but boosts wages at exporting ￿rms.
Similarly, a fall in input tari￿s raises wages at import-using ￿rms relative to those at ￿rms that only source
inputs locally. Using Indonesian ￿rm-level census of manufactures data, which reports ￿rm-level measures of
intermediate input use that are used to construct input tari￿s, they ￿nd strong empirical support for both
predictions.23
12 Firm Export Market Dynamics
Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on heterogeneous ￿rms and trade focuses on the cross-section
distribution of trade across ￿rms, products and countries. More recent research has begun to explore the
22For evidence using Brazilian and Swedish employer-employee data, see Krishna et al. (2010) and Davidson et al. (2010)
respectively.
23For evidence on the relationship between the ￿rm skill premium and input and output tari￿s, see Amiti and Cameron
(2011).
22dynamics of ￿rm’s decisions to enter export markets and its implications for the impact of trade liberalization.
Using transactions-level customs data for Colombia, Eaton et al. (2008) examines the dynamics of ￿rm-
destination exports over the period 1996-2005. In a typical year, nearly one half of all Colombian exporters
were not exporters in the previous year. These new exporters are small as a share of total exports and most
do not continue exporting in the following year. Total exports are instead dominated by a small number of
large and stable exporters. Nonetheless, out of each cohort of new exporters, a fraction of ￿rms go on to
rapidly expand exports, and over the period of less than a decade, these successful new exporters account for
almost half of total export growth. Firms typically begin exporting in a single foreign market and, if they
survive, gradually expand into additional destinations. The geographic pattern of their expansion paths, and
their likelihood of survival as exporters, depend on their initial destination market.
One line of research has sought to explain these export dynamics in terms of learning, as in Eaton et al.
(2011c), Akhmetova (2011), and Albornoz et al. (2011). According to this view, ￿rms update their priors
about pro￿tability in export markets based upon their initial sales, and hence either exit or expand their
penetration of export markets over time. In Albornoz et al. (2011), export market pro￿tability is uncertain
and correlated across export markets. As a result, a ￿rm may enter an export market even if the expected
pro￿ts from entering that market alone are negative, because of the option value of expanding to additional
export markets if successful. An implication of this framework is that ￿rm export market growth should
be particularly rapid in the ￿rst year of exporting, which receives empirical support in Argentinian trade
transactions data.24
Another line of research tries to explain these export dynamics through stochastically shocks to produc-
tivity, as in Arkolakis (2011) and Ruhl and Willis (2011). As productivity evolves over time, ￿rms decide
whether to enter or exit individual export markets and whether or not to continue production. In Arkolakis
(2011), these stochastic shocks to productivity are combined with a model of endogenous market penetration.
A ￿rm enters a market if it is pro￿table to incur the marginal cost to reach the ￿rst consumer and pays
an increasing market penetration cost to reach additional consumers. The model is calibrated using data
on the cross-section of ￿rms and their sales across markets as well as the rate of incumbent ￿rm exit. The
calibrated model is shown to be quantitatively successful in predicting ￿rm exit, growth, and the resulting
￿rm-size distribution in the US manufacturing data.
Bernard et al. (2009b) use transaction level data to compare the role of the extensive and intensive
margins in accounting for cross-section and time-series patterns of trade. The extensive margins of the
number of ￿rms and products drive the majority of the variation in trade ￿ows across countries. In contrast,
year-on-year changes in trade are driven by the intensive margin of trade within continuing ￿rm-product-
24In the presence of learning and imperfect contract enforcement, Araujo et al. (2011) argue that institutions may a￿ect
export dynamics. Other things equal, exporters have higher initial exports and remain as exporters for longer in countries with
better contracting institutions. However, conditional on survival, the growth rate of a ￿rm’s exports to a country decreases with
the quality of the country’s institutions.
23country trade relationships. One reason for the relative small contributions of extensive margins over short
time intervals is that entering and exiting exporters, as well as recently added and about-to-be-dropped ￿rm-
product-country trade relationships, are on average relatively small compared to continuing ￿rm-product-
country trade relationships. Conversely, conditional on survival, entering exporters and recently added
￿rm-product-country trade relationships grow more rapidly than incumbent exporters and continuing ￿rm-
product-country trade relationships. Analysis of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s con￿rms these time-series
results: while there are substantial changes in the extensive margin of the number of exporters, the majority
of the change in the dollar value of trade around the Asian crisis is driven by the intensive margin. Notably,
the extensive and intensive margins behave di￿erently for arms-length and related-party trade, suggesting
that the global production networks of large multinational corporations play a role in in￿uencing the response
of the macroeconomy to shocks.
13 Conclusion
Empirical ￿ndings from microdata on plants and ￿rms proposed a number of challenges to traditional theories
of international trade and stimulated the development of new models of heterogeneous ￿rms and trade. These
new theories explain empirical ￿ndings that only some ￿rms export, exporters are larger and more productive
than non-exporters, and trade liberalization raises average productivity through reallocations of resources
across ￿rms within industries.
These new theories highlight additional mechanisms through which the aggregate economy is a￿ected by
the opening of trade and have stimulated further empirical research exploring these mechanisms. Aggregate
economic relationships such as the gravity equation are largely driven by the extensive margins of ￿rms and
products rather than the intensive margin of average exports per ￿rm-product. Reductions in trade costs
induce endogenous changes in internal ￿rm organization as ￿rms adjust their range products, their decisions
about whether to serve foreign markets through trade or overseas production, and their choices about whether
to organize foreign production within or beyond the boundaries of the ￿rm. To the extent that wages vary
with ￿rm revenue and only some ￿rms export, ￿rm heterogeneity provides a new mechanism for trade to
a￿ect wage inequality.
While early research concentrated on ￿rm exporting using plant or ￿rm-level data, the availability of
customs data on individual trade transactions has enhanced our ability to look inside the black box of the
￿rm and led to an explosion of research across a broad range of areas. These include multi-product ￿rms,
intra-￿rm trade, intermediation, and the dynamics of ￿rm entry into export markets. There remain many
fundamental issues ahead, such as the microfoundations of trade costs, further exploration of the boundaries
of the ￿rm, and further consideration of the relationship between ￿ndings from disaggregated data and the
economy’s aggregate response to trade.
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33Table 1: Exporting by U.S. Manufacturing Firms, 2002
Percent of Firms
Percent of Firms 
that Export
Mean Exports as a 
Percent of Total 
Shipments
311 Food Manufacturing 6.8 11.6 14.8
312 Beverage and Tobacco Product 0.7 22.9 7.4
313 Textile Mills 1.0 25.1 12.5
314 Textile Product Mills 1.9 12.2 11.7
315 Apparel Manufacturing 3.2 7.7 13.5
316 Leather and Allied Product 0.4 24.4 13.4
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 5.5 8.5 18.5
322 Paper Manufacturing 1.4 23.8 9.0
323 Printing and Related Support 11.9 5.5 14.4
324 Petroleum and Coal Products 0.4 17.8 11.5
325 Chemical Manufacturing 3.1 36.1 14.3
326 Plastics and Rubber Products 4.4 28.1 10.3
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product 4.0 9.5 12.1
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 1.5 30.2 10.4
332 Fabricated Metal Product 19.9 14.3 11.6
333 Machinery Manufacturing 9.0 33.0 15.5
334 Computer and Electronic Product 4.5 38.3 21.3
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliance, 1.7 37.7 12.9
336 Transportation Equipment 3.4 28.0 13.0
337 Furniture and Related Product 6.4 6.5 10.1
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 9.1 1.6 14.9
Aggregate Manufacturing 100.0 17.6 14.1
Source: Bernard et al. (2007).
NAICS Industry
Notes: Data are from the 2002 U.S. Census of Manufactures. Column 2 summarizes the distribution of 
manufacturing firms across three-digit NAICS manufacturing industries. Column 3 reports the share of 
firms in each industry that export. The final column reports mean exports as a percent of total shipments 
across all firms that export in the noted industry. 
34Table 2: Exporter Premia in U.S. Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3)
Log Employment 1.19 0.97 .
Log Shipments 1.48 1.08 0.08
Log Value Added per Worker 0.26 0.11 0.10
Log TFP 0.02 0.03 0.05
Log Wage 0.17 0.06 0.06
Log Capital per Worker 0.32 0.12 0.04







Source: Bernard et al. (2007).
Notes: Data are for 2002 and are from the U.S. Census of Manufactures. All results 
are from bivariate OLS regressions of firm characteristic in first column on a 
dummy variable indicating firm's export status. Columns two and three include 
industry fixed effects and industry fixed effects plus log firm employment, 
respectively, as additional controls.  Total factor productivity (TFP) is computed as 
in Caves et al (1982). Capital and skill per worker are capital stock and non-
production workers per total employment, respectively. All results are significant at 
the 1 percent level.
35A. Share of Exporting Firms
Number of 
Products
1234 5 + A l l
1 40.4 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 42.2
2 10.4 4.7 0.8 0.3 0.4 16.4
3 4.7 2.3 1.3 0.4 0.5 9.3
4 2.5 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.7 6.2
5+ 6.0 3.0 2.7 2.3 11.9 25.9
All 64.0 12.6 6.1 3.6 13.7 100.0
B. Share of Export Value
Number of 
Products
1234 5 + A l l
1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5
3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5
4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.6
5+ 2.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 92.2 98.0
All 3.3 1.5 1.2 1.0 92.9 100.0
C. Share of Employment
Number of 
Products
1234 5 + A l l
1 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1
2 1.9 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.6
3 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 3.3
4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.6
5+ 3.5 2.6 4.3 4.1 68.8 83.3
All 14.2 6.7 5.5 4.3 69.2 100.0




Notes: Data are from the 2000 LFTTD. Table displays the joint distribution of 
U.S. manufacturing firms that export (top panel), their export value (middle 
panel) and their employment (bottom panel), according to the number of products 
firms export (rows) and their number of export destinations (columns). Products 
are defined as ten-digit Harmonized System categories.
Table 3: Distribution of Exporters and Export Value by Number of Products 
and Export Destinations, 2000
36Table 4: Gravity the Margins of Trade
ln(Valuec) ln(Avg Exportsc)l n ( O b s c)l n ( F i r m s c) ln(Productsc) ln(Densityc)
ln(Distancec) -1.37 0.05 -1.43 -1.17 -1.1 0.84
0.17 0.1 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.13
ln(GDPc) 1.01 0.23 0.78 0.71 0.55 -0.48
0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Constant 7.82 6.03 1.8 0.52 3.48 -2.2
1.83 1.07 1.81 1.59 1.55 1.37
Observations 175 175 175 175 175 175
Fixed Effects No No No No No No
R
2
0.82 0.37 0.75 0.76 0.68 0.66
Source: Bernard et al. (2011).
Notes: Table reports results of OLS regressions of U.S. export value or its components on trading-
partners' GDP and great-circle distance (in kilometers) from the United States. All five columns are 
country-level regressions. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are noted below each coeficient. Data 
are for 2002. 








Log Employment 1.50 1.40 1.75
Log Shipments 0.29 0.26 0.31
Log Value Added per Worker 0.23 0.23 0.25
Log TFP 0.07 0.12 0.07
Log Wage 0.29 0.23 0.33
Log Capital per Worker 0.17 0.13 0.20
Log Skill per Worker 0.04 0.06 0.03
Source: Bernard et al. (2007)
Notes: Data are for 1997 and are for firms that appear in both the U.S. Census of 
Manufacturers and the LFTTD. All results are from bivariate OLS regressions of 
firm characteristic in first column on dummy variable noted at the top of each 
column as well as industry fixed effects and firm employment as additional controls. 
Employment regressions omit firm employment as a covariate. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is computed as in Caves et al (1982). Capital and skill per 
worker are capital stock and non-production workers per total employment, 
respectively. All results are significant at the 1 percent level.
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